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Both water contamination threats andintentional water contamination incidentscould be designed to disrupt the delivery of
safe water to a population, interrupt fire protection,
create public panic, or cause disease or death in a
population.  A water contamination threat occurs
when the introduction of a contaminant into the water
system is threatened, claimed, or suggested by
evidence.  A water contamination incident occurs
when a contaminant is successfully introduced into
the water supply.  A water contamination incident
may be preceded by a threat, but not always.  Both
water contamination threats and incidents may be
of particular concern due to the range of potential
consequences:
1. Creating an adverse impact on public health
within a population
2. Disrupting system operations and interrupting
the supply of safe water
3. Causing physical damage to system
infrastructure
4. Reducing public confidence in the water supply
5. Long-term denial of water and the cost of
remediation and replacement.
Some of these consequences would only be realized
in the event of a successful contamination incident;
however, the mere threat of contamination can have
an adverse impact on a water system if improperly
handled.
In characterizing any threat, both the possibility
and probability should be considered.  A general
assessment of the threat of intentional contamination
of drinking water indicates that it is possible to cause
varying degrees of harm through contamination of
the drinking water supply.  However, an evaluation
of past incidents at drinking water facilities would
indicate that the probability of an actual
contamination incident is relatively low, but the
probability of a contamination threat is relatively high.
Many of the apparent security breaches at drinking
water utilities that have occurred since 9/11 have
been perceived as potential contamination incidents.
Although a few threats have been verbal, most have
been circumstantial, such as a low-flying airplane
over a reservoir or a lock cut from the hatch of a
distribution system storage tank.  Given the possibility
of contamination, many utilities choose to treat these
security breaches as potential contamination threats.
Vulnerabilities to intentional contamination exist
in all drinking water systems.  While it may be
possible to improve security at some critical system
locations to reduce the level of vulnerability, it is
impossible to eliminate all vulnerabilities.  Thus, the
contamination threat may be most effectively
managed through thorough planning, careful
evaluation of any specific threats, and implementation
of appropriate response actions.
Managing a Contamination Threat
Management of a contamination threat involves:
1) planning for the response prior to an incident, 2)
evaluating the credibility of the threat, and 3)
implementing appropriate response actions based on
available information and the circumstances of the
situation.  This article provides an overview of the
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process for managing a contamination threat, while
more detailed guidance is available from the
Response Protocol Toolbox: Planning for and
Responding to Drinking Water Contamination
Threats and Incidents (EPA 2003a).  This toolbox
is organized into six modules, which discuss water
utility planning (EPA 2003b), water contamination
threat management (EPA 2003c), site
characterization and sampling (EPA 2003d), sample
analysis (EPA 2003e), public health response, and
water system remediation and recovery.  Additional
resources for drinking water security in general may
be found at the EPA Water Security Division website
(http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security/).
1. Planning a Response to Contamination
Threats
Planning is the foundation of making good
response decisions.  For water contamination threats
and incidents, planning takes on a special meaning
because of the multitude of potential and/or
threatened contaminants, whether they are
biological, chemical, or radiological.  However, to
paraphrase the World Health Organization, it is
neither possible nor necessary to specifically plan
for attack with all possible contaminants, but
increasing preparedness to counter the effects for
such an attack by planning and preparation can
provide the capabilities to deal with a wide range of
possibilities (WHO 2003).
Planning for any type of emergency, including
water contamination threats and incidents, begins at
the local level.  Officials within the utility and local
government will have a collective knowledge of the
organizations and systems that exist to provide
support during an emergency.  During this planning,
the utility and local or state authorities will need to
determine:
1. Who will respond to the initial threat?
2. Who will determine if the threat is possible or
credible?
3. Who will evaluate the site and collect samples?
4. Who will perform analyses?
5. Who will make public health decisions?
6. Who will manage remediation and recovery
activities?
In many cases, the answers to these questions
will not be immediately evident, or may vary with
the circumstances of the situation.  This is especially
true in the case of drinking water contamination
threats where it is unclear whether or not the water
has been contaminated and presents a threat to public
health.  Proper planning should establish roles and
responsibilities of various parties under a variety of
scenarios.  There are many planning activities that
a drinking water utility can undertake to improve
preparedness and the ability to respond effectively
to a drinking water contamination threat or incident,
and several are briefly described below.
1. Know your water system:  This includes
documentation of construction, design, operation,
and personnel; assessment of vulnerabilities to
contamination threats; and identification of
critical customers.
2. Update Emergency Response Plans:  Many
utilities have existing Emergency Response
Plans (ERPs); however they may need to be
updated to cover terrorist threats, including
intentional contamination.
3. Develop Response Guidelines:  A set of
Response Guidelines (RG) is a streamlined,
action-oriented, easy-to-follow document that
is intended to support responders and decision
officials in the midst of a crisis.  An RG might
include organizational charts, notification trees,
contact information, standard operating
procedures, decision trees, and reporting forms
among other tools.
4. Establish Structure for Incident Command:  The
leadership and chain-of-command must be
clearly established prior to an actual threat or
incident.  There is a formal Incident Command
System that has been adopted by many response
organizations (FEMA 2003).  Incident
Command for drinking water response is
intricate because the water utility may be
handling the early stages of the threat evaluation,
while other parties, such as law enforcement,
may be in charge during later stages
(EPA 2003b).
5. Develop Information Management Strategy:
Timely and accurate information will be key to
evaluating the credibility of a threat and taking
steps to protect public health as necessary.  A
system should be in place to manage the flow
of this critical information.
6. Establish Communication and Notification
Strategy:  Predefined communication pathways
and notification trees are essential to the
effectiveness of any incident command
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structure and will help to ensure that important
parties are notified at the right time.
7. Perform Training and Conduct Desk/Field
Exercises:  Training and practice are essential
to the proper application of any emergency plan
(e.g., ERP, RG).  Desk-top or field exercises
that involve all of the key players are a valuable
test of the plan.
8. Enhance Physical Security:  Enhancements to
physical security at sites identified as particularly
vulnerable to contamination, or which have been
subject to intrusion in the past, may significantly
reduce false alarms that would otherwise
expend utility resources.
9. Establish a Baseline Monitoring Program:
Unusual water quality data or consumer
complaints may indicate a potential problem, but
only if the results can be compared against an
established baseline that accounts for normal
fluctuations.
2. Evaluating a Contamination Threat
A contamination threat is typically triggered by
an occurrence or discovery that indicates the
potential for water contamination.  Several potential
threat warnings are summarized in Figure 1.  Threat
warnings occur on a regular basis if they are
monitored; however, the vast majority are due to
harmless activity and require no response.
Nonetheless, every threat of potential drinking water
contamination should be evaluated in order to identify
the handful of credible threats that might exist among
the large number of threat warnings.
The overall response to a contamination threat is
schematically depicted in Figure 2 and indicates two
parallel and inter-related activities: the threat
evaluation and response actions.  A fundamental
principle of this process is the concept of expanded
response actions as the credibility of the threat
increases.  This is intended to avoid both under- and
over-response to a contamination threat since both
have potential adverse consequences to the public.
For example, a complete lack of response to a
credible threat might put the public at an
unacceptable risk of exposure to a harmful
contaminant.  On the other hand restrictions placed
on water usage, such as a notice not to drink the
water, in response to a threat that has not been
determined to be credible carries its own
consequences.
A threat evaluation is a process that considers
available information about a contamination threat
to determine if it is “possible,” “credible,” or a
“confirmed” incident.  Each of these stages is
depicted in Figure 2 as a decision point and described
in more detail below:
1. Stage 1: “Is the threat possible?”  A water
contamination threat is characterized as
“possible” if the circumstances of the threat
Initial Threat Evaluation
T
H
R
E
A
T
 E
V
A
L
U
A
T
IO
N
P
R
O
C
E
S
S
Is Threat
Possible?
Threat Warning
PLANNING AND PREPARATION
Is Threat
Credible?
Is Incident
Confirmed?
Site Characterization and
Sampling
Immediate Operational
Response Actions
Public Health Response
Actions
Sample Analysis
Remediation and Recovery
E
X
P
A
N
D
E
D
R
E
S
P
O
N
S
E
 A
C
T
IO
N
S
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warning appear to have provided an opportunity
for contamination.  Response to a “possible”
threat might include immediate operational
response actions in an attempt to contain the
water, and collection of additional information
to help establish whether or not the threat is
“credible.”  Site characterization activities are
designed to collect additional information to
support this determination.
2. Stage 2: “Is the threat credible?”  A water
contamination threat is characterized as
“credible” if information collected during the
threat evaluation process (e.g., site
characterization activities) corroborates
information from the threat warning.  The
threshold at the credible stage is higher than that
at the possible stage, thus more significant
response actions might be considered, such as
restrictions on public use of the water (e.g.,
issuance of a “do not drink” notice).
Furthermore, steps should be initiated to confirm
the incident and positively identify the
contaminant.
3. Stage 3: “Has the incident been confirmed?”  A
water contamination incident is “confirmed” if
the information collected over the course of the
threat evaluation provides definitive evidence
that the water has been contaminated.  Response
actions at this point include all steps necessary
to protect public health, supply the public with
an alternate source of drinking water, and begin
remediation of the system.
3. Responding to a Contamination Threat
Figure 2 illustrates the elevation of potential
response actions as the threat evaluation progresses
through the “possible,” “credible,” and “confirmed”
stages.  In addition to the results of the threat
evaluation, consideration should be given to the
potential consequences of the suspected
contamination incident as well as the impact of
response actions on consumers.  The consequences
of contamination are a function of contaminant
properties (e.g., toxicity, infectivity, persistence in
water, etc.), the concentration profile of the
contaminant through the system, and the population
within the contaminated area.  In many cases, it will
be difficult to accurately assess the potential
consequences since the identity of the contaminant
may be unknown and the information necessary to
estimate the spread of the contaminant through the
system may be unavailable.  Nonetheless, even an
estimate of potential consequences within a couple
orders of magnitude may be useful in making
decisions regarding response actions (e.g., are tens
or thousands of people potentially affected?).
Various response actions will have different
impacts on consumers.  For example, immediate
operational response actions such as containment
may go unnoticed by the public.  On the other hand,
restrictions on water usage could have a substantial,
negative impact on consumers.  Consumers may
need to find an alternate supply of water for
consumption and food preparation.  For the most
severe restrictions, sanitation and fire fighting may
also be adversely impacted.
Early in the response to a contamination threat,
before credibility has been established and
consequences evaluated, relatively low impact
response actions would be appropriate.  For example,
isolation of a storage tank, reservoir, or small area
of the distribution system might be a suitable
response to a ‘possible’ contamination threat.  Once
a threat has been deemed ‘credible’ it may be
necessary to take steps to limit public exposure.  This
might involve more extensive isolation, or if the
suspect water cannot be contained, it may be
necessary to notify the public and place restrictions
on water usage (i.e., issue a “do not drink” order).
Finally, once a contamination incident is confirmed,
all actions necessary to limit exposure and protect
public health should be initiated.  Furthermore, it will
be necessary to arrange for an alternate water
supply and begin planning for remediation activities.
Summary
All drinking water systems have some degree of
vulnerability to contamination, and analysis shows
that it is possible to contaminate drinking water at
levels causing varying degrees of harm.
Furthermore, experience indicates that the threat of
contamination, overt or circumstantial, is probable.
Thus, there is a clear need to address the
contamination threat.  While certain steps may be
taken to reduce the vulnerabilities and prevent
intentional contamination, it is impossible to
completely eliminate this vulnerability, although a
utility could spend a lot of resources trying to do so.
Instead, it may be more effective to plan for
responding to contamination threats that do arise.
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